

**Searching for a Just Peace in Darfur: Exposure to Violence and Reconciliation**

Undergraduate Research Thesis

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## **Abstract**

Sociological research has studied the implementation and effects of transitional justice mechanisms on societies recovering from mass atrocities like genocide, but little is known about the attitudes of victims before the transitional justice mechanisms are implemented. This article analyzes over 1,500 interviews from Darfuri genocide victims living in refugee camps in eastern Chad to assess the relationship between their exposure to violence and their punitive attitudes towards perpetrators. I find that respondents with both familial and/or personal exposures to violence have higher odds of favoring the death penalty for Sudanese government officials and army commanders but that they have lower odds of choosing the same fate for Sudanese government soldiers. The respondents' age, gender, voting history, knowledge of international response to the conflict, and personal opinions on the possibility of living peacefully with former enemies are also consequential. I conclude by discussing the role personal connections and military conscription could play in the relationship as well as the overall importance of incorporating victims' attitudes into post-conflict transitional justice decisions.

## **Introduction**

In what the United Nations has called the world's worst humanitarian crisis (UN 2004), hundreds of thousands of Darfuri people have been killed and millions more have been displaced by the genocide in Darfur, Sudan. Although international organizations like the International Criminal Court (ICC) have struggled to intervene in the region, the perpetrators of the genocide are still in power and the violence has not ended. How do familial and person victimization during the Darfuri genocide influence punitive attitudes towards perpetrators of these crimes? This article attempts to answer this question by analyzing whether and how these exposures to violence are associated with punitive attitudes of Darfuri genocide victims. Though much is

known about the punitive and restorative responses to mass atrocity, little is known about victims' attitudes regarding punishing perpetrators, particularly while the conflict is still ongoing like the Darfuri genocide.

Following a brief discussion of the history of Darfur, I summarize literature on why and how a nation reconciles mass atrocities by implementing transitional justice mechanisms. I then discuss the limited existing literature on punitive attitudes in the context of genocide. Next, I turn to a discussion of the methods and analysis where I explain the logistic regression model I use to quantitatively analyze interview data from 1,576 Darfuri refugees living in camps in eastern Chad. Findings reveal that respondents with personal exposure to violence have higher odds of preferring the death penalty for leaders responsible for mobilizing crime—government officials and army commanders—but have lower odds of preferring the death penalty for the actual perpetrators of the crime—the soldiers. Respondents with familial exposure to violence also have higher odds of preferring the death penalty for government officials and army commanders, though there is no significant relationship between familial exposure to violence and punitive attitudes towards government soldiers. The article closes by discussing two potential explanations for the respondents' lower punitive attitudes towards soldiers: first, soldiers may have been from the same community as victims creating personal connections between them and their victims and, second, Sudanese mandatory military conscription requirements may allow victims to place blame on the officials giving orders, not the soldiers.

## Darfur: A Historical Background

In February 2003, two rebel groups known as the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) launched an attack against the Sudanese government, accusing the government of neglecting non-Arab peoples in Darfur, the western region of Sudan. The Sudanese government responded to the rebel attacks with a complete offensive against Darfur, specifically targeting “African”<sup>1</sup> tribes like the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa groups. The Sudanese government armed and trained a mostly Arab militia known as the Janjaweed who work in conjunction with Sudanese government soldiers to attack villages with aerial and ground bombardments, resulting in widespread death and mutilation of the Darfuri people (Bassil 2004). In contrast to the tribal Janjaweed militia, the Sudanese government soldiers involved in the attacks are typically a part of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the national armed forces of Sudan which employs mandatory military conscription<sup>2</sup>.

Though the government officials and army commanders play a role in organizing and mobilizing the violence, the Janjaweed and government soldiers are the actual perpetrators<sup>3</sup> of the violence against the Darfuri people (Flint 2009). deWaal (2007) notes that the Sudanese government soldiers supplement attacks by the Janjaweed, who were given permission by the Sudanese government to pursue their own territorial expansion agendas if they suppress the rebellion. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) estimate that between 300,000 and 400,000 people were killed and two to three million people were displaced in the first few years of the

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<sup>1</sup> The term “African” is written in quotation marks because, in Sudan, it is a socially constructed division most often juxtaposed against “Arab.” President Omar al-Bashir consolidated and otherized the ethnic groups when he derogatorily called them “Zourga” and demanded to end their history (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). For more information on Sudanese and Darfuri identity formation, reference: de Waal, Alex. 2005. “Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external engagement.” *African Affairs*. 104 (415): 181-205.

<sup>2</sup> The SAF does use mandatory military conscription, though there is disagreement about the age of conscription (Copley 2006).

<sup>3</sup> The phrase “actual perpetrators” refers to the people carrying out the violence on the ground as opposed to leaders who plan the violence or arm the soldiers.

conflict. Accurate numbers of the genocide's devastation are difficult to estimate (Hagan & Palloni 2006) and the death toll is expected to be even higher now that eight years has passed since these estimates. In addition to extensive death and displacement, sexual victimization is a marked issue in the region. While men do experience sexual violence, a disproportionate amount of women are abducted, raped, mutilated, and returned to their villages by the soldiers, forcing the women to live with the stigma and dishonor of their sexual violation (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). Today, Darfur remains a dangerous warzone plagued with both Arab and non-Arab people being exposed to high amounts of violence.

Despite the severity of the violence in Darfur, this conflict is not the first wide-scale atrocity committed within Sudan's borders. Darfur was an independent sultanate until 1916 when it became a neglected colony of Britain (deWaal 2007). Darfur saw no large societal advances through the late 1950s because of British inattention, making the people impoverished and the region underserved. Over the course of multiple generations after the fall of the sultanate, the Darfuri people attempted to assimilate into Sudanese culture in an attempt to be seen as legitimate citizens by dominant traders and officials. When the Darfuri people demanded greater attention from the Sudanese government in the 1980s and 1990s, their requests went unanswered, sparking smaller conflicts in the region (Flint & deWaal 2008). Simultaneously, civil wars raged outside of Darfur in greater Sudan and Chad, resulting in further marginalization of the non-Arab populations within those territories (deWaal 2007).

The longstanding conflict between Arab and non-Arab populations in the region compounded with other genocidal factors such as arming of the Janjaweed, racial targeting, direct government involvement in the violence, and sexual violence; the presence of the aforementioned factors qualifies the violence in Darfur as a genocide according to Article II of

the Genocide Convention (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008)<sup>4</sup>. Savelsberg (2015) emphasizes that classifying the mass atrocity in Darfur as genocide is monumentally important, as it criminalizes the violence and dictates the ways international bodies like the International Criminal Court responds. In fact, the ICC opened an investigation which resulted in the indictment of three Sudanese government officials<sup>5</sup>, including the sitting president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. Al-Bashir—charged with multiple counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide—is the first sitting head of state indicted by the ICC. In late 2014, Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda (2014) decided to table the investigation, citing the United Nations Security Council’s inaction and the ICC’s limited resources as causes for tabling all active investigations. The ICC’s inaction has allowed President Omar al-Bashir’s regime to continue the violence, marking thirteen years of destruction to the Darfuri people.

### **Justice, Punitive Attitudes, and Prosecuting State Actors**

The pursuit of justice is fundamental to social life (Rawls 1971) and it is particularly important to consider justice when addressing human rights abuses after periods of mass atrocities. The processes that societies use to redress previous human rights violations during particularly violent historical periods are increasingly classified as “transitional justice” (Arthur 2009; Boraine et al. 1994). Transitional justice is implemented through different mechanisms

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<sup>4</sup> There is no universally agreed upon standard definition for genocide. Some scholars believe the Genocide Convention’s definition is flawed and, as a result, prefer definitions that include other factors not listed here, like violence against a political group. Others argue that the conflict in Darfur qualified as genocide at one point in time, but does not meet the definition currently. Based on the studies listed in the background section, this study considers the conflict in Darfur to be genocide.

<sup>5</sup> The three Sudanese government officials indicted by the ICC were Omar al-Bashir (President of Sudan), Ahmed Mohammed Haroun (current Governor of South Kordofan and former Sudanese Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs), and Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein (current Governor of Khartoum State and former Minister of Interior of Affairs). Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, a senior commander of the Janjaweed known as “colonel of colonels” and three rebel force leaders—Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Saleh Jerbo, and Abdallah Banda—were also indicted by the ICC.

such as prosecuting perpetrators, providing reparations to victims, creating truth commissions, and memorializing victims in order to respond to a group's violent past (Fischer 2011; ICTJ 2015).

The transitional justice mechanism of holding political actors legally accountable for their actions marks a rapid shift that Kathryn Sikkink (2013) has termed the “justice cascade.” The justice cascade is the process of prosecuting political leaders who were previously immune to punishment for human rights abuses. The conflict in Darfur exemplifies the advances associated with the justice cascade, as multiple key government officials—including sitting president Omar al-Bashir—have already been indicted by the ICC for their involvement in the atrocities (Savelsberg 2015).

Despite the growing potential to hold political actors criminally liable for their actions, some question whether it is preferable to prosecute and punish perpetrators or forgive and forget past crimes in times of transition (Minow 2002; Menkel-Meadow 2007). While successors of violent regimes may feel obligated to hold criminals accountable for their actions, create a new rule of law, and attempt to deter future crimes, some argue it is also necessary for both state actors and victims to compromise and forgive past abuses in order to move forward (Roht-Arriaza 1995). Inherent in this dilemma is the distinction between restorative and retributive justice. Restorative justice centers on the victim, emphasizing the repair of social relations with an eye toward the future; retributive justice, conversely, focuses on punishing the perpetrator with an eye toward past crimes (Braithwaite 2002).<sup>6</sup> Though many studies exist regarding how both restorative and retributive transitional justice mechanisms are implemented and the effects

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<sup>6</sup> There was previously much debate about which form of justice—restorative or retributive—was better suited for transitional justice. Presently, however, transitional justice scholars have increasingly come to a consensus that restorative and retributive mechanisms should be used in conjunction to most effectively achieve the goals of transitional justice.

(Kim & Sikkink 2010; Olsen et al. 2010), there is little evidence on the victims' preferences between restorative or retributive transitional justice mechanisms (van de Merwe 2009). Bratton (2011) analyzed victims' punitive attitudes in the context of the violent political campaigns in Zimbabwe and found that victims of political violence are more likely to want legal redress in the transitional political structure. These findings indicate victims' clear retributive justice preference after violent conflicts which suggest that victims in a violent conflict like the one in Darfur may experience the same retributive justice preference.

There is limited existing literature on punitive attitudes in non-Western societies and a particular gap in literature about punitive attitudes while conflicts are still ongoing. Existing studies conducted in Western societies like the United States, however, reveal that the strongest indicators for punitive attitudes are race, education, income, fear of crime, and marital status (Dowler 2003). Although research does indicate that different demographics of a society can influence punitive attitudes, there is by no means a consensus on which demographic information has the greatest effect on punitive attitudes (Cohn et al. 1991). There is, nevertheless, a general agreement that there is a link between the perceived seriousness of a crime and punitive attitude (Blumstein & Cohen 1980; Hamilton & Rytina 1980). Those crimes seen as incredibly violent (like murder and rape) are often correlated with higher punitive attitudes whereas less violent crimes (like theft and vandalism) are associated with lower punitive attitudes. The majority of crimes committed during the Darfuri conflict are the aforementioned violent offenses that are traditionally associated with higher punitive attitudes. I expect that people with an exposure to these violent offenses in the Darfuri conflict will have higher punitive attitudes.



## Methodology

To assess the relationship between exposure to violence and thoughts on reconciliation, I examine data collected by 24 Hours for Darfur, a nonprofit organization working to end the conflict in Darfur. For this study, I use 1,576 interviews conducted in twelve eastern Chad refugee camps between April and July of 2009. Refugees over the age of eighteen were chosen for the interviews using a stratified sample approach. As such, the data are representative of the adult Darfuri population across the twelve refugee camps studied. The stratified random sampling method used geographic location (camp and block) and gender as strata. The first stratum was location, with the number of interviews from a given block in a given camp set to be proportional to the population of the block. An equal number of men and women were sampled in each block, constituting an oversampling of men as there are fewer men in the camps than women. 24 Hours for Darfur has worked to ensure that the statistics accurately reflect the population of the eastern Chad camps by weighting different groups. Oversampled groups (like men) were given a weight less than 1 while groups that were not oversampled (like women) were given a weight greater than 1<sup>7</sup>.

Respondents voluntarily answered questions in one-on-one interviews conducted in their place of residence using either Arabic or a local language. The research team conducting the interviews consisted of 27 people, most of whom had worked or lived in Sudan or Chad and had extensive experience in refugee camp environments<sup>8</sup>. The majority of interviewers spoke a combination of Darfurian Arabic, Fur, Zaghawa, or Massalit. Every team member was required to complete a 10 day training session on survey methodology and administration.

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<sup>7</sup> Although preliminary analysis does not suggest that the weights will influence the findings, I intend to account for the weights in subsequent analysis.

<sup>8</sup> 18 the 27 members of the research team were Darfurian expatriates living in the United States, United Kingdom, or Chad.

The questionnaire used in the interviews was created over an 18 month period in consultation with both academic experts and members of the Darfuri diaspora. The questionnaire was originally produced in English and translated to Sudanese Arabic by two separate translators. These two versions were then compared and merged into one Sudanese Arabic translation. After the initial translation, the merged Sudanese Arabic version was back-translated into English by two additional translators. All four translators met to discuss all four versions of the survey and produced a final translated version of both the English and Sudanese Arabic questionnaire. This final version was translated into Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit<sup>9</sup>. Once translated, preliminary versions of the questionnaire were piloted in Brooklyn, NY, Chad, and the United Kingdom between April 2008 and March 2009. The finalized surveys conducted for this study had approximately 75 questions and took approximately one hour for interviewers to conduct. At the beginning of each interview, interviewers expressed that the goal of the study was to gauge their beliefs on the necessary conditions for a just peace in Darfur. The respondents were asked about their demographic information and thoughts on peace, justice, and reconciliation. For example, respondents were asked what they knew of the ICC, if they believed they could live peacefully with their former enemies, and if they had ever previously voted in a Sudanese government election.

The data are limited to the adult Darfuri population living in the camps surveyed, so the data is not representative of the entire population of Darfur or even all persons victimized in the Darfuri genocide. The data is only able to capture the opinions of those persons who survived the genocide, meaning the views of those who experienced the greatest atrocity in the genocide—murder—are unable to be represented. Additionally, the views of the survivors living in the

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<sup>9</sup> Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit are traditionally non-written languages, so these translations were produced using a phonetic Arabic translation.

externally displaced refugee camps<sup>10</sup> represented here may differ from the large population of Darfuri refugees unable to make it to the external camps. Since the surveys were conducted six years ago, the attitudes represented by the data are only indicative of the respondents' attitudes at that time. The duration of time spent in the camps and lack of resolution in the genocide may alter respondents' answers if they were surveyed again today or post-conflict. The surveys were conducted a couple months after the ICC issued their first warrant of arrest for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. As such, the temporal proximity to ICC indictments of key government leaders could have influenced the responses. Since over 7 years have passed since the initial indictment of al-Bashir with no resolution to the conflict, present attitudes could differ significantly from those recorded by the survey in 2009. Finally, the data are limited by the scope of the questions asked and answers given. Due to the sensitive nature of the questions on genocide, violence, and injuries, the data are restricted by the information offered by respondents.

### *Dependent Variables*

To gauge punitive attitudes, respondents were asked if they believe former combatants responsible for violence should be punished, pay a fine, publicly apologize, or be granted amnesty.<sup>11</sup> An overwhelming majority of respondents noted that they would only agree to the perpetrators being punished. Respondents were then asked what punishments they felt should be given to each actor involved in the violence: Sudanese government officials, Sudanese army

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<sup>10</sup> Refugee camps, or externally displaced camps, are those shelters outside of Darfur's borders. These are contrasted with internally displaced camps, the camps set up within Darfur's borders, for people unable to leave Darfur's borders. The experiences of people living in internally displaced camps differs from the experiences in refugee camps, so this study only reflects the population living in external refugee camps in eastern Chad.

<sup>11</sup> For more information on the specific wording of each question referenced in the paper and potential answers respondents could choose, reference Appendix I.

commanders, and Sudanese government soldiers<sup>12</sup>. More than sixty percent of respondents chose the death penalty for each group over a prison sentence or a fine. As a result, this study uses the respondents' desire for the death penalty for the Sudanese government, army commanders, and soldiers as the three measures for punitive attitudes. It is important to disaggregate each actor as opposed to merging all Sudanese government actors into one variable because each actor plays a different role in the genocide and has different contact with victims. Government officials are responsible for perpetuating the image of non-Arab peoples as an outgroup and arming the Janjaweed and government soldiers and the army commanders are responsible for organizing the military action. The soldiers, on the other hand, are the only actors who typically come into direct contact with the victims as they are the people committing the violence.

### *Independent Variable*

The respondent's exposure to violence is measured in two ways: personal and familial. Descriptive statistics of both personal and familial exposure to violence can be found in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively<sup>13</sup>. Personal exposure is gauged by whether or not the respondent was personally maimed in the conflict. Familial exposure is measured by whether or not any of their family members—specifically parents, siblings, spouses, children—have been killed in the genocide. As these experiences of violence are sensitive topics for victims of mass atrocities, the interviewers did not ask for specific details on what “maimed” meant for each respondent, how the family members died, or which family members died. For the purposes of this study, “maimed” signifies that the respondent was personally injured in some way as a direct result of

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<sup>12</sup> Respondents were also asked about appropriate punishments for the Janjaweed commanders, Janjaweed soldiers, Darfurian rebel commanders, Darfurian rebel soldiers, and bandits. These variables were not included in this study.

<sup>13</sup> These tables have different *n* than those used in the regression. The *n* used in the regression is lower than the *n* listed in Table 1 and 2 because fewer respondents answered all questions used for the study's dependent, independent, and control variables.

the conflict in Darfur.<sup>14</sup> The independent variables can only gauge whether the respondent was injured and whether a family member was killed in the genocide, not the extent of the injury or magnitude of the incidents represented.

*Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Personal Exposure to Violence*

	Number	Percentage
Have Been Personally Maimed	643	34.93%
Have Not Been Personally Maimed	1,198	65.07%
Total	1,841	100%

*Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Familial Exposure to Violence*

	Number	Percentage
Family Has Been Killed	1,312	76.86%
Family Has Not Been Killed	395	23.14%
Total	1,707	100%

### *Control Variables*

The study's control variables include demographic information like the respondent's age<sup>15</sup>, sex, education, whether they have children, and their marital status as Dowler (2003) found that these demographics influence punitive attitudes. I also control for whether the respondent previously voted in an election since some of the perpetrators are government officials who were elected to their positions and the respondents' perceptions of political legitimacy could affect their punitive attitudes towards these officials. Additionally, I control for whether respondents believe they can live peacefully with their former enemies and if they

<sup>14</sup> In the conflict, there are differences in gender-based violence but this measure does not capture the *form* of violence. It is only capturing a general personal exposure to violence.

<sup>15</sup> I assessed whether the effect of age is quadratic, though the effect is linear.

believe that reconciliation is possible between Darfuri tribes because those who do not believe either are possible may have higher punitive attitudes to ensure they do not have to live with their former enemies once more or reconcile with other tribes. I control for the knowledge of the ICC and its functions as familiarity with international bodies that can prosecute perpetrators may lead to higher punitive attitudes. Finally, I control for whether the respondents would be satisfied if only the leaders were punished for crimes, meaning the actual perpetrators of the crimes would go unpunished<sup>16</sup>. Respondents who said that they would not be satisfied with only the leaders being punished may be at higher odds to prefer punitive punishments for all actors in the violence, not just the leaders.

### *Analysis*

The three dependent variables (supporting the death penalty for Sudanese government officials, Sudanese army commanders, and Sudanese government soldiers) are binary variables coded as 1 if the respondent supports the death penalty for each respective actor and 0 otherwise. Ordinary least squares regression is consequently not appropriate and I instead employ logistic regression. Logistic regression measures the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables by estimating probabilities using a logistic function. In the forthcoming analysis, I present results using odds ratios to increase readability. This involves exponentiating the logistic regression coefficients. Thus, coefficients larger than one are associated with increased odds of supporting the death penalty, while coefficients smaller than one are associated with decreased odds of supporting the death penalty.

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<sup>16</sup> Specifically, respondents were asked if they would be very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied “If people who personally committed crimes against you or your community were not punished in a criminal justice system, but their bosses were.”

## Results

Table 1 includes the results of the logistic regression of *personal* exposure to violence and support of the death penalty. Table 2 includes the results of the logistic regression of *familial* exposure to violence and support of the death penalty. For both tables, Model 1 examines support for the death penalty for Sudanese government officials, Model 2 examines support for the death penalty for Sudanese army commanders, and Model 3 examines support for the death penalty for Sudanese government soldiers.

Turning first to Table 1, Models 1 and 2 indicate that people who have been personally maimed in the conflict have significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for Sudanese government officials and Sudanese army commanders. However, someone who was personally maimed has significantly *lower* odds of preferring the death penalty for Sudanese government soldiers (Model 3). In other words, people who have been personally injured in the conflict have less punitive attitudes for the actual perpetrators of the violence and more punitive attitudes for those organizing the violence. Results in Table 2 tell a similar story as the one told by Table 1. Models 1 and 2 indicate that people whose family members have been killed in the conflict have significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for Sudanese government officials and Sudanese army commanders. Each table of results reveals that a higher exposure to violence increases the punitive attitudes towards the organizers of the violence. Unlike Table 1, though, there is no significant relationship between familial exposure to violence and support for the death penalty for government soldiers.

*Table 3: Logistic Regression of Personal Exposure to Violence & Support of Death Penalty (Odds Ratios)*

VARIABLES	Model 1 Government Officials	Model 2 Army Commanders	Model 3 Government Soldiers
Personally Maimed	1.378** (1.040 - 1.824)	1.304** (1.010 - 1.684)	0.807* (0.641 - 1.017)
Age	0.989** (0.980 - 0.999)	0.990** (0.981 - 0.999)	0.996 (0.987 - 1.004)
Female	2.205*** (1.599 - 3.041)	1.674*** (1.253 - 2.236)	2.031*** (1.566 - 2.635)
Attended School	1.215 (0.891 - 1.658)	0.890 (0.665 - 1.189)	0.655*** (0.504 - 0.851)
Married	0.919 (0.496 - 1.705)	0.986 (0.556 - 1.747)	1.039 (0.613 - 1.761)
Have Children	1.576 (0.881 - 2.820)	1.362 (0.792 - 2.341)	1.068 (0.644 - 1.771)
Previously Voted in Sudanese Election	0.726** (0.549 - 0.960)	0.726** (0.560 - 0.940)	0.819 (0.642 - 1.044)
Believes Reconciliation is Possible between Darfuri Tribes	0.514*** (0.353 - 0.750)	0.609*** (0.436 - 0.849)	0.718** (0.541 - 0.951)
Heard of ICC, Does Not Know Much About Roles	1.574** (1.081 - 2.292)	1.476** (1.037 - 2.101)	1.296 (0.936 - 1.796)
Heard of ICC, Knows About Roles	2.041*** (1.238 - 3.366)	1.323 (0.841 - 2.081)	1.324 (0.864 - 2.029)
Somewhat Possible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies	1.024 (0.673 - 1.559)	0.909 (0.625 - 1.322)	0.914 (0.626 - 1.334)
Somewhat Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies	1.217 (0.656 - 2.258)	1.435 (0.818 - 2.519)	1.590* (0.948 - 2.668)
Strongly Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies	1.598*** (1.182 - 2.161)	2.285*** (1.730 - 3.019)	2.730*** (2.114 - 3.527)
Somewhat Satisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished	1.006 (0.560 - 1.806)	0.835 (0.484 - 1.442)	0.299*** (0.167 - 0.536)
Somewhat Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished	1.370 (0.656 - 2.863)	0.899 (0.479 - 1.690)	0.548* (0.297 - 1.011)
Very Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished	1.564*** (1.141 - 2.144)	1.606*** (1.197 - 2.155)	1.057 (0.801 - 1.394)
Constant	1.837 (0.804 - 4.199)	1.528 (0.708 - 3.296)	1.070 (0.523 - 2.185)
Observations	1,576	1,576	1,576

Significance Level: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



*Table 4: Logistic Regression of Familial Exposure to Violence & Support of Death Penalty (Odds Ratios)*

VARIABLES	Model 1 Government Officials	Model 2 Army Commanders	Model 3 Government Soldiers
Family Members Were Killed in Conflict	1.369** (1.009 - 1.860)	1.400** (1.053 - 1.860)	1.006 (0.768 - 1.318)
Age	0.990** (0.980 - 1.000)	0.990** (0.981 - 0.999)	0.995 (0.987 - 1.004)
Female	2.088*** (1.505 - 2.897)	1.610*** (1.198 - 2.163)	2.040*** (1.564 - 2.661)
Attended School	1.208 (0.877 - 1.663)	0.882 (0.655 - 1.190)	0.667*** (0.510 - 0.874)
Married	0.961 (0.498 - 1.852)	0.925 (0.505 - 1.694)	1.131 (0.655 - 1.953)
Have Children	1.367 (0.724 - 2.579)	1.313 (0.736 - 2.345)	1.018 (0.600 - 1.728)
Previously Voted in Sudanese Election	0.689** (0.515 - 0.921)	0.693*** (0.530 - 0.905)	0.757** (0.588 - 0.973)
Believes Reconciliation is Possible between Darfuri Tribes	0.538*** (0.365 - 0.792)	0.650** (0.462 - 0.914)	0.728** (0.544 - 0.974)
Heard of ICC, Does Not Know Much About Roles	1.483** (1.009 - 2.179)	1.439** (1.004 - 2.063)	1.276 (0.916 - 1.778)
Heard of ICC, Knows About Roles	2.087*** (1.227 - 3.549)	1.303 (0.812 - 2.089)	1.362 (0.874 - 2.123)
Somewhat Possible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies	1.128 (0.721 - 1.766)	1.016 (0.685 - 1.507)	0.905 (0.609 - 1.344)
Somewhat Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies	1.403 (0.742 - 2.653)	1.664* (0.936 - 2.957)	1.657* (0.979 - 2.806)
Strongly Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies	1.600*** (1.168 - 2.192)	2.433*** (1.821 - 3.250)	2.892*** (2.217 - 3.773)
Somewhat Satisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished	1.085 (0.588 - 2.004)	0.868 (0.494 - 1.526)	0.327*** (0.179 - 0.596)
Somewhat Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished	1.311 (0.622 - 2.762)	1.033 (0.537 - 1.990)	0.637 (0.339 - 1.196)
Very Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished	1.656*** (1.195 - 2.294)	1.680*** (1.240 - 2.275)	1.090 (0.819 - 1.450)
Constant	1.723 (0.723 - 4.106)	1.320 (0.590 - 2.952)	0.908 (0.430 - 1.920)
Observations	1,466	1,466	1,466

Significance Level: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

*Note for both Table 1 and 2: For the ordinal variable measuring knowledge of the ICC, “No Knowledge of the ICC or Its Functions” is excluded. For the ordinal variable measuring whether respondents believe they can peacefully live with their enemies, “Strongly Possible” is excluded. Finally, the category denoting those who would be “Very Satisfied” if only the leaders (and not the actual perpetrators) were punished is excluded.*

Before discussing the potential mechanisms behind these findings, I briefly review the control variables. Each of the observations on the control variables is true for the specified models in both Table 1 and Table 2. With each one-year increase in age, respondents have slightly lower odds of preferring the death penalty for government officials (Model 1) and army commanders (Model 2). In all three models across both tables, women have significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty. In addition to gender, knowledge of the ICC and its functions also influenced respondents' attitudes about the death penalty. Specifically, respondents who had some understanding of the functions of the ICC had higher odds of preferring the death penalty for government officials and army commanders compared to those respondents who knew nothing of the ICC's functions. People who have attended any amount of schooling in their lifetime have lower odds of choosing the death penalty for government soldiers. While age, gender, and education can influence the relationship between exposure to violence and punitive attitudes, no such effects are seen with marital status and children.

Turning to respondent's voting history, those persons who had previously voted in at least one Sudanese governmental election had lower odds of preferring the death penalty for all actors, regardless of the type of exposure to violence they experienced. Similarly, people who believe that reconciliation is possible between the tribes of Darfur also have lower odds of preferring the death penalty for all actors in both measures of exposure to violence. For those respondents who hold the belief that it is possible to live together peacefully with former enemies, those who said that they believed it was "Strongly Impossible" to live peacefully had significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for all three Sudanese government actors. Finally, respondents who noted that they would be "Very Unsatisfied" if the actual perpetrators of crime went unpunished but the perpetrators' bosses received punishment had 1.56

to 1.68 times higher odds of preferring the death penalty for both Sudanese government officials and army commanders compared against those who said they would be “Very Satisfied” with only bosses being punished. This same variable was not significantly associated with supporting the death penalty for government soldiers, however.

## **Discussion and Conclusions**

This study has analyzed the association between personal and familial exposures to violence in Darfur and the punitive attitudes of the adult Darfuri refugees living in camps in eastern Chad. Most significantly, it found that refugees who were personally maimed and refugees whose family members were killed in the conflict have significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for actors who organize the violence, including Sudanese government officials and Sudanese army commanders. Yet, the individuals who have been personally maimed have significantly lower odds of preferring the death penalty for the actual perpetrators of the violence—Sudanese soldiers.

This finding could offer key insights into the way victimized populations believe perpetrators of mass violence will be reintegrated into their societies. In this case, respondents may have higher odds of preferring the death penalty for the government officials and army commanders because they do not have personal relationships with these actors, whereas the government soldiers may have once been members of their communities. In addition, Sudan mandates military conscription for all men between the ages of 18 and 30 (Copley 2006), so respondents may see soldiers as following orders and thus may not view them as responsible. Instead, blame is allocated toward those giving the orders, which include government officials and army commanders.

It is also noteworthy that women had significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for perpetrators than men. This could possibly be explained by gendered experiences of violence in Darfur. Generally, men are likely to suffer injuries like the loss of a limb and men are more likely to be killed. While men can also be victims of sexual violence, women are much more likely to suffer from sexual violence, like rape and genital mutilation, which can be seen as a more personal invasion of their bodily autonomy (Kaiser & Hagan 2015). Women are also more likely to be detained for longer periods of time by perpetrators, suggesting that the violence they experienced may have lasted for longer durations. However, respondents were understandably not asked to elaborate on the types of violence they personally experienced due to the sensitivity of the subject, so the mechanism behind this effect cannot be further examined.

The lower odds of preferring the death penalty associated with schooling and past voting history suggest a negative correlation between both punitive attitudes/education and punitive attitudes/civic engagement, meaning higher education and civic engagement correlates to lower punitive attitudes. It is intuitive that those respondents who believe that reconciliation is possible between Darfuri tribes have lower odds of preferring the death penalty since a person with a strong belief in reconciliatory potential would not necessarily need to resort to highly punitive punishments. The narrative is further supported by those individuals with higher punitive attitudes who do not believe they can live peacefully with their former enemies since the death penalty would remove any opportunity for respondents to live with their former enemies.

As the genocide in Darfur is ongoing and international action has stalled, it is imperative to understand specific actions that can be taken to achieve justice for the Darfuri people. It is insufficient to base political action solely on the consensus of international and domestic leadership, as their opinions may differ from those victimized in the conflict. This research helps

to explain Darfuri victims' punitive attitudes. More broadly, this study elucidates what victims of large-scale atrocities believe is the most appropriate outcome for those perpetrators who commit heinous crimes. This provides a better understanding for international and domestic lawmakers as they work to make informed decisions about reconciling past harms and preventing future crimes.

## **Appendix I**

Below is a list of each of the questions used in this study, exactly as they are worded in the 24 Hours for Darfur survey given to respondents.

### *Independent Variables:*

1. Have you suffered violence/were you physically maimed in an attack related to the current conflict?
  - a. Potential answers: Yes, No, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood
2. How many of your immediate family members (parents, siblings, spouses, children) were killed in attacks related to the current conflict?
  - a. Open ended numerical response

### *Dependent Variables:*

1. (Referring to eight actors—including Sudanese government officials, Sudanese army commanders, and Sudanese government soldiers—that were listed in a previous question): What should their punishment be?
  - a. Potential answers: Death, Prison Sentence, *Diyya*, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood

### *Control Variables*

1. How old are you?
  - a. Open ended numerical response
2. Sex?
  - a. Potential answers: Male, Female
3. Have you ever attended school or religious school?
  - a. Potential answers: Yes, No, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood
4. What is your marital status?
  - a. Potential answers: Married, Single, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood
5. Do you have children?
  - a. Potential answers: Yes, No, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood
6. Have you ever voted in an election for a political official?

7. I am going to read a statement. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. "Reconciliation is possible between the tribes of Darfur."
  - a. Potential answers: Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, Strongly Disagree, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood
8. Which of the following best represents your knowledge of the International Criminal Court (ICC)?
  - a. Potential answers: I have not heard of the ICC, I have heard about the ICC but do not know very much about what it does, I have heard about the ICC and I understand what it does, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood
9. Some people say that it is possible for former enemies to live peacefully together after a war. Some people say that it is not possible for former enemies to live peacefully together after a war. Do you believe strongly that it is possible, somewhat that it is possible, somewhat that it is impossible, or strongly that it is impossible?
  - a. Potential answers: Strongly Possible, Somewhat Possible, Somewhat Impossible, Strongly Impossible, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood
10. If people who personally committed crimes against you or your community were not punished in a criminal justice system, but their bosses were. Would you be very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied?
  - a. Potential answers: Very Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied, Somewhat Unsatisfied, Very Unsatisfied, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood

#### *Other Questions Referenced in Study*

1. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of these statements.
  - b. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or who raped women should not be accepted in their communities in any case and they should be punished.
  - c. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or raped women should be accepted and what happened should be forgotten.
  - d. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or raped women could be accepted if they pay *diyya*.
  - e. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or raped women could be accepted if they do nothing more than apologize publicly and beg for forgiveness.
    - i. Potential answers to all questions: Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, Strongly Disagree, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood

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